Do We Still Owe Iraq?

by Zaid A. Zaid

Noah Feldman’s book What We Owe Iraq1 is a unique contribution to the ongoing discourse—mainly amongst academics, former military personnel, and diplomats who served in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—regarding the past, present, and future of Iraq. In 2004, I served as the liaison from the CPA to the Iraqi Governing Council and now join the discussion from that vantage point. After discussing Feldman’s primary points, this review confronts the central issue in his book: whether the United States should remain in Iraq given the deteriorating political and security situation there. Feldman argues that the United States has a moral and ethical obligation to remain in Iraq until there is a viable government with a monopoly on the use of force, i.e., when Iraqis are exercising full political and military sovereignty over the country. Although What We Owe Iraq has weaknesses, mainly its failure to address implications of civil war and American public opinion, I agree that the United States should not withdraw until it is clear that Iraq’s institutional structure can sustain a viable democracy. The United States must help Iraqis maintain control of their country. Contrary to Feldman, however, I argue that the United States should remain in Iraq not because it has a moral or ethical obligation to do so, but because remaining in Iraq is in the national interest of the United States. The United States has an obligation, but it is not to Iraq. It is an obligation to the American people, to do what is in our national interest, whether or not it coincides with Iraq’s national interest. Ideally, these interests will converge, but the United States’ own citizens must have priority.

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