Georgia Death Penalty Law Upheld by 11th Circuit

The Eleventh Circuit recently upheld Georgia’s statute prohibiting the execution of defendants with developmental disabilities, even though it requires defendants to prove they are disabled beyond a reasonable doubt – a higher threshold than any other state. The majority noted that, while the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional the execution of those with developmental disabilities, it has allowed states to decide how to implement that principle.

A dissenting judge argued that the reasonable doubt standard will be nearly impossible to meet for those with mild developmental disabilities, because the diagnosis involves subjective assessments of the defendant’s behavior. Persons with mild disabilities can often function in society, and “these adaptive abilities are frequently mischaracterized by judicial factfinders as evidence that the individual is not [developmentally disabled].” The dissent argued that requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt will eviscerate the Eighth Amendment rights of those with mild developmental disabilities, who constitute the vast majority of the developmentally disabled population.

The majority noted these concerns, but it emphasized that a federal statute limits the court’s standard of review. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) includes a series of “reforms” that limit a federal court’s ability to grant writs of habeas corpus to inmates facing the death penalty.  The AEDPA says a federal habeas court should only overturn a state court’s decision if it contradicts clearly established law. This high standard of review makes it harder for federal courts to protect certain constitutional rights.

In Hill, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the right of individuals with developmental disabilities to avoid execution is clearly established by the Supreme Court, but there is no clear indication from the Court that a high burden of proof violates this right.  Since there was no precedent, the court found that the law was not clearly established.  However, a lack of precedent in Hill is not surprising, given that the defendant asserted an Eighth Amendment right that originated in 2002.

Unlike other constitutional rights, the Eighth Amendment right to be free from “cruel and unusual punishments” is not based on historic rights or common law, but on evolving standards of decency in criminal justice. The Court will survey state statutes to ascertain these standards and determine whether criminal sanctions are excessive.  When the Court uses this analysis to recognize a new constitutional right, there likely will not be a history of courts interpreting it. These rights are, by their nature, always evolving.  By limiting review of a state court’s Eighth Amendment decisions, the AEDPA makes it harder for federal courts to vindicate Eighth Amendment rights.

One sponsor of the AEDPA said the law aims to “curb these endless, frivolous appeals of death sentences by those convicted of murder.”  But how is it more efficient to have appellate courts wait for the Supreme Court to rule on an issue, instead of reviewing state courts’ interpretations of the Constitution? As in other areas of the law, the circuit courts can develop their own precedents, and the Court can review their decisions.