The Imperatives of Forging a Unified and Cohesive Domestic Opposition in Syria

The Arab League’s unprecedented approval of sanctions against Syria comes on the heels of a foreboding escalation of violence, leading the European Union to finally acknowledge that it is “increasingly urgent and important” to protect civilian lives in Syria. However, the EU has not yet endorsed even France’s limited proposal for EU-backed humanitarian corridors to allow aid groups such as Red Cross into the country to bring medical supplies to cities wrecked by strife, such as Homs.

France’s Foreign Minister Alain Juppe mooted this proposal after meeting with the leader of the Syrian National Council (SNC)—an umbrella coalition of opposition groups—and it has been criticized as marking a “major escalation” of foreign involvement in Syria. Must the international community, however, continue to wring its hands in impotent despair while the bloodshed of innocents continues unabated?

The core norm in international law governing the use of force is enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits members from threatening or using force against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN, while preserving a right to self-defense under Article 51. Article 2 (7) further provides that the UN cannot intervene in matters which are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,” unless enforcement measures are authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VlI. The Security Council, under Articles 40-42 of Chapter VII, can authorize a broad range of measures, including economic sanctions and the use of force.

The “Right to Protect” / “Responsibility to Protect” paradigm is currently invoked in such situations as engendering an affirmative obligation to intervene, but actual incursions into a country’s territory require Chapter VII authorization. Russia and China have previously vetoed a resolution condemning the bloodshed and backing the use of “targeted measures” against al-Assad in the face of continued repression. They contend that NATO had misused a previous UN measure, authorizing the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, to justify several months of air strikes and to promote regime change. They further claim that a similar resolution against Syria might be a pretext to further political, as opposed to humanitarian, objectives.

However, there is another avenue whereby a country that wishes to intervene—forcefully or otherwise—in a situation occurring in another state’s territory can lawfully do so without Chapter VII authorization: with the consent of the state whose territorial integrity or personal sovereignty is breached by proposed coercive action within its borders. Conceivably, this could be accomplished by trying to establish an alternative entity as the “legitimate” or “real” government of the Syrian people, and predicate intervention on its invitation to help protect the Syrian people.

Certain developments have hinted at a gradual, inexorable move towards according international recognition to an alternative entity—see, e.g., the Arab League’s suspension of Syria under al-Assad’s regime, safe havens in Turkey and Jordan for Syrian Army defectors, pressure to allow the the SNC to open an office in Turkey, and so forth. However, in order to cement and legitimize this move, it is important to mold and project an integrated and cohesive challenge to al-Assad’s regime.

The National Initiative to Unify the Syrian Opposition has claimed that there is as yet no “opposition body that has the confidence of the Syrians and the international community to act as a real transitional body.” Other opponents of al-Assad have criticized the front-runner, the SNC, for being fractured by political and personality differences, and urged it to reach out to grassroots activists, ethnic minorities and veteran political opposition leaders. Thus far, only post-Qaddafi Libya has accorded recognition to the SNC, though France and Britain have recently made friendly overtures towards it. Given the strategic importance of gaining recognition as a credible alternative to al-Assad’s regime, the “real”—read: genuinely representative—Syrian opposition body needs to stand up, and soon.